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PREFACE 
In this Discussion Paper a case in favour of abolition 
of import protection for New Zealand industries is 
presented. The paper was originally written as a 
consultant's report for Federated Farmers of New Zealand 
during October 1987. 
The main arguments in favour of abolition of protection 
that are considered include: increased efficiency of 
resource use that produces once-and-for-all or static 
increases in Gross Domestic Product and higher economic 
growth or dynamic increases in Gross Domestic Product; 
removal of an implicit and perverse subsidy to the main 
metropolitan areas; removal of an implicit and perverse tax 
on regional New Zealand; and removal of an implicit 
regressive tax on low income households. 
Some insights into the future of New Zealand as a less 
protected economy are also provided. 
The author, Mr R.L. St.Hil1, is a senior lecturer in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Marketing. 
Professor A . C .  Zwart 
DIRECTOR 

SUMMARY 
This paper is a response to the Tariff Working Party 
Report to the Minister of Trade and Industry, 1987. 
Objectives of the paper are to: expand the case for removing 
import protection; provide some insight into the future of 
New Zealand as a less protected economy; and emphasise the 
importance of interpreting the removal of protection in the 
context of an integrated policy package. 
A number of arguments about static effects of import 
protection are discussed, namely comparative advantage, 
costs of lobbying and costs of economic slack. The dynamic 
inefficiency argument is also discussed. 
It is shown that removal of protection would have 
greatly assisted low income households by making the prices 
of goods that they buy (or would like to buy) cheaper, 
thereby removing an implicit regressive tax. This would 
happen without an accompanying long term increase in 
unemployment. 
Some evidence on the perverse nature of import 
protection as an implicit subsidy paid to the major 
metropolitan areas and an implicit tax paid by regional 
areas is presented. It is suggested that removal of 
protection would be a very positive form of regional 
assistance. 
It is noted that removal of import protection is best 
implemented as part of a package of policies designed to 
improve flexibility and efficiency throughout the economy 
and to maintain a low real exchange rate during the 
transition period. 
The conclusion is that New Zealand's future economic 
welfare is most likely to be higher without import 
protection. Complete removal of protection over a period of 
about five years is recommended. 

SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This discussion Paper is a response to the Tariff 
Working Party Report to the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
1987. Objectives of the paper are to: 
(i) expand the case for removing import protection; 
(ii) provide some insight into the future of New Zealand 
as a less protected economy; and 
(iii) emphasise the importance of interpreting the 
removal of protection in the context of an 
integrated policy package. 
The paper concludes that New Zealand's future economic 
welfare is most likely to be higher without import 
protection. Complete removal of import protection over a 
period of about five years is recommended. 

SECTION 2 
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR DISMANTLING IMPORT PROTECTION 
Backaround 
Chapter 4 of the Working Party Report sets out the case 
for dismantling protection largely in terms of the 
comparative advantage argument for free trade. Essentially 
this argument states that a country should aim at using its 
resources in such a way as to maximise its total output. To 
ensure that the right mixture of goods and services is 
available for consumption, output not required for domestic 
consumption should be swapped on the international market 
for goods and services that are required for domestic 
consumption but are not domestically produced. Under 
comparative advantage, the test for efficiency is not 
whether a tonne of product EX can be produced using fewer 
resources in New Zealand than overseas but whether or not, 
within New Zealand, a tonne of product EX can be produced 
using fewer resources than a tonne of product ZED. 
Despite the strong intuitive appeal of comparative 
advantage some empirical research suggests that the 
comparative advantage gains from removing import protection 
are quite small. This much is alluded to in Chapter 4 of 
the Report. In a recent review of research on trade regimes 
it was found that the comparative advantage effect of 
removal of import protection seldom increases consumption by 
more than a few percent (see La1 and Rajapatirana, 1987). 
New Zealand research confirms this result (see Philpott, 
1985 and Pickford, 1987). It might be tempting, therefore, 
to concede the theoretical point but dismiss free trade as 
offering very little gain in practice. 
Although comparative advantage alone might not offer 
large gains in consumption there are other arguments for 
removal of assistance that should be recognised. These 
include costs of lobbying, economic slack and dynamic 
inefficiency. Each of these arguments is considered below. 
2.2 Costs of Lobbyina 
Removal of import protection opens an economy to foreign 
competition. If some imported products are cheaper than 
domestically produced equivalents some domestic businesses 
might collapse. In this situation shareholders and 
employees lose (but not necessarily for ever) and purchasers 
of imports gain. It is quite rational, in terms of self- 
interest, for the potential losers to expend resources in 
lobbying (or rent-seeking, to use the jargon of economists) 
against removal of protection. Because there are usually 
relatively few potential losers who think they stand to lose 
a lot and relatively many potential gainers who think they 
stand to gain a little, individual losers often work 
strenuously to retain the status quo but individual gainers 
do very little. (A classic work on this aspect of human 
behaviour is Olson, 1965.) 
Resources expended on lobbying represent a "deadweight" 
loss to an economy. Resources are wasted because they are 
used to change the distribution of income rather than 
increase the size of the nation's income. The deadweight 
loss is only worth bearing if the redistribution of income 
is in a socially desirable direction. 
A recent study of Turkey (Grais and others, 1984) found 
that if tariffs, but not quotas, were removed there would be 
little impact on total output. The study found that, if 
quotas were also removed, total output would increase by 
between 5 and 10 percent. The conclusion was that, as long 
as any form of import protection existed, significant 
deadweight losses associated with lobbying would be imgosed 
on the economy. 
2.3 Economic Slack 
An ever present danger in a business that is protected 
from competition (by import protection or any other means) 
is that it will gradually develop economic slack. In the 
economics literature this is referred to as X-inefficiency 
(see Leibenstein, 1980). X-inefficiency can take a number 
of forms: common forms are failure to innovate in production 
and management technologies, "sweetheart" agreements with 
labour unions and perquisites such as lavish offices and 
luxury motor vehicles for senior personnel. The inevitable 
result of X-inefficiency is low productivity. 
An important study of the costs of X-inefficiency 
arising from import protection was undertaken in the early 
1970s (see Bergsman, 1974) . Results of the study are 
summarised in Table 1 below. It is noteworthy that, 
although X-inefficiency costs showed variation among 
countries they were consistently much higher than the costs 
of ignoring comparative advantage. 
Static Costs of Import Protection 
The costs of protection already discussed are all static 
in the sense  t h s t  they affect the size of the economic cake 
at a paint in tine rather than growth of the cake over time. 
Meverthe;ess, z3ey are  important, Even if each of the  costs 
- c a m p a r a ~ i ~ r e  ail~iant,age costs, lobbying costs and c a s t s  nf 
economic sLack - % r e  individually small, together 2h.e' 
regreser;.t a s i z e a b l e  Local cost. Therefore complete remt,..-tzi 
of p r o t e z c t - 3  w c u l d  produce a very worthwhile once-and-fx- 
all incrass3 in zhz ZLae of the economic cake. 
Table 1: Costs of Import Protection in Four 
Developing Countries 
Country Comparative X-inefficiency Total Cost* 
Advantage Cost* Cost* 
% % % 
Brazil 
Mexico 0.3 2.2 2.5 
Pakistan 0.5 5.4 5.9 
Philippines 1.0 2.6 3.6 
* Cost is expressed as a percentage of total output 
as measured by Gross National Product. 
Source: La1 and Rajapatirana (1987) 
Dynamic Inefficiency 
Import protection can be a source of cumulative output 
losses, or dynamic inefficiency, because it reduces 
competitive pressures in a domestic market. It reduces the 
incentive to innovate at both production and management 
levels. In the last decade or so statistical investigation 
of this question has been very extensive, particularly in 
developing countries. Most researchers have looked for 
evidence for or against the proposition that free-trading, 
or "outwardly-oriented", countries achieve high rates of 
economic growth on a sustainable basis. The Tariff Review 
Committee Report outlined results of a recent World Bank 
study (in Chapter 4) but there have been many others. Two 
important points have emerged from the research. 
First, both import protection and export assistance tend 
to be associated with relatively low rates of economic 
growth: higher rates of economic growth are observed when 
there is neither import protection nor export assistance, 
that is, when trade policy is neutral. 
Second, there is wide variation in rates of economic 
growth among different countries. This latter point is 
clearly evident from a recent comprehensive study of export 
performance and output growth in 70 developing countries 
(see Goncalves and Richtering, 1986) and implies that a 
country's trade policy is an important but not a singular 
determinant of economic growth. Other determinants include 
macroeconomic policy, social policy and political stability. 
The issue of dynamic inefficiency has also been 
investigated by relating the proportion of its manufactured 
output that a country exports to the degree of its 
manufacturing protection. There is evidence that, the more 
protectionist a country is, the smaller the proportion of 
its manufactured output that is exported (see Olson, 1982 
and 1984). In Table 2 some relevant data are set out. It 
is clear from the table that there is a negative 
relationship between import protection in manufacturing and 
export of manufactured goods. 
Overall, the evidence on exports and economic growth 
suggests that a country can significantly enhance its 
potential for economic growth by adopting a neutral trade 
policy stance. 
Table 2: Manufacturing Protection and Manufactured 
Exports, 1973. 
High Manufacturing Protection Low Manufacturing Protection 
Country Percentage of Country Percentage of 
Manufactured Manufactured 
Goods Exported Goods Exported 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
Greece 
India 
Israel 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Spain 
Turkey 
Yugoslavia 
Austria 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
South Korea 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Sweden 
Taiwan 
Source: From Olson (1984). Original Source: United 
Nations 
2.6 Some Other Important Considerations 
In Chapter 5 of the Working Party Report a number of 
arguments in favour of import protection were advanced. 
Clearly the Review Committee was not persuaded by these 
arguments because it stated in its Report that, "As lower 
and more uniform tariffs are desirable, a properly managed 
programme of tariff reform building on earlier decisions to 
remove import licensing and reduce higher tariffs can be 
beneficial to the economy" (p. 70, emphasis added). Because 
some of the arguments in favour of import protection have 
strong intuitive appeal it is important to point out their 
weaknesses. 
First, the infant industry argument suggests that new 
industries need temporary protection until, through 
"learning-by-doing" and achieving economies of scale, they 
attain their true efficiency level. What this argument 
implies is that society is so short-sighted or ill-informed 
that it will not invest in new industries that are efficient 
in the longer term. If this is true there is a case for 
temporary protection. The most transparent form of 
protection under this circumstance would be a per unit 
production subsidy (bounty) paid for a short and non- 
extendable period of time. Imposition of a tariff or import 
licence for an indefinite time would be quite inappropriate. 
Second, the balance of payments argument suggests that, 
in the presence of chronic balance of payments deficits on 
the current account (goods and services), curbs on imports 
are necessary. However, it is much too simplistic to assume 
that balance of payments deficits are caused by "too many 
imports" because they might also be said to be caused by 
"too few exports". In truth, both problems arise because 
the foreign exchange rate is too high. The futility of 
curbing imports to control the balance of payments is 
illustrated by New Zealand's own economic history. In 29 
out of the last 35 years New Zealand has recorded a balance 
of payments deficit on the current account despite having 
import controls of varying intensity during that time. 
Third, the terms of trade argument suggests that, if a 
country has enough economic power to influence world prices, 
a carefully applied system of import and export taxes can 
reduce import prices and raise export prices at the border. 
Under this circumstance a country is like a monopoly that 
can dictate prices to both suppliers of inputs and consumers 
of outputs. 
Small countries seldom have a large enough share in any 
world market to be able to exercise much economic power. 
Furthermore, although New Zealand has a large share of the 
international market for some pastoral products, it is not 
clear that this confers much economic power. The rest of 
the world can easily find substitute suppliers and 
substitute products in the longer term (for example, 
synthetic carpet yarn is a substitute for wool; white meat 
is a substitute for red meat). 
A further problem is that the system of import and 
export taxes can only work if the rest of the world does not 
retaliate. Because there is a widespread perception that 
import protection (by other countries) is unfair it is naive 
to believe that there would be no retaliation, even if it 
imposed high economic costs on all countries concerned. 
Fourth, the fairness argument suggests that domestic 
industries ought to be protected against "unfair" foreign 
competition. The main sources of unfair competition are 
cheap labour and assistance provided to overseas producers. 
The Working Party Report pointed out that the cheap labour 
argument is too simplistic because what matters is "the 
relative cost of factors of production" (p. 44, their 
emphasis) and the productivity of labour. Cheap labour only 
represents unfair competition if labour is cheap for non- 
economic reasons such as repression of the working classes. 
Even then it is likely that unimpeded international trade 
would do much to expose repressive political regimes to 
world opinion and gradually force them to mend their ways. 
Compensating domestic industries for assistance to 
overseas industries sounds like a commonsense thing to do 
because it accords with most people's sense of "fair play". 
However, if a country could permanently import products at a 
lower price because of assistance to overseas producers, it 
should not restrict those imports but accept them and 
rejoice that the rest of the world was silly enough to 
subsidise its consumption. The smart thing to do would be 
to quietly accept the subsidy and enjoy the higher standard 
of living that it made possible. 
SECTION 3 
THE FUTURE OF NEW ZEALAND AS A LESS PROTECTED ECONOMY 
3.1 Backsround 
Three important issues have been raised in debate over 
economic policy in New Zealand. These are: 
(i) economic growth, 
(ii) distribution of consumption among households, and 
(iii) distribution of production among regions. 
The first is addressed in Section 2. In this section 
the latter two issues are considered in the context of the 
removal of import protection. The conclusion is that, 
overall, removal of import protection will have positive 
effects on distribution. 
Distribution of Consumption Amons Households 
Although the size of the economic cake matters, another 
important indicator of economic and social success of a 
country is distribution of that cake among households. The 
main determinant of the level of consumption an individual 
household can achieve is its income. In Table 3 some 
relevant data for New Zealand in 1985/86 are set out. It is 
clear from Table 3 that lower income households spent more 
of their income than higher income households. Now, because 
many consumption items such as clothing, footwear, textiles 
and motor vehicles receive import protection, their prices 
to New Zealand buyers are higher than they otherwise would 
be. Because lower income households spend more of their 
income than higher income households, but in roughly the 
same proportion among items, import protection acts as a 
regressive tax. What this means is that lower income 
households pay proportionately more import protection "tax" 
than do higher income households. This tax has not been 
directly measured in New Zealand but Hickok (1985) found 
that import protection is a severely regressive implicit tax 
in the United States. 
Table 3: Household Income and Expenditure, 1985-86 
Income Group Annual Gross Average Proportion 
Income ( 1) Weekly of Income 
Expenditure ( 2 ) Spent ( 3 
$ $ % 
1 39,000 and over 699 
2 28,000 to 38,999 494 
3 20,000 to 27,999 388 
4 12,000 to 19,999 298 
5 less than 11,999 184 
Notes: 
(1 Regular income from all sources before income tax 
(2) Average expenditure of households in this income 
group 
(3) See Appendix I for explanation of this column 
Source: Calculated from data in Department of Statistics 
(1987) 
The regressive nature of the import protection tax is 
further illustrated in Table 4. The table shows 
distribution of purchases by expenditure sub-group and 
household income for expenditure sub-groups for which lower 
income households reported significantly fewer purchases 
than higher income households in the 1985-86 Household 
expenditure and Income Survey. 
For example, 53.0 per cent of households in income 
group 1 in the Survey reported making mortgage repayments; 
only 13.7 per cent of households in income group 5 did. It 
is a fact that most of the items included in the table are 
subject to import protection which inflates their prices to 
domestic buyers (see Syntec Economic Services, 1984, 
Lattimore, 1985, and Appendix 2 of this paper). Therefore 
it seems that import protection very adversely affects low 
income households who have to economise by making fewer 
purchases. Because there is such a huge disparity between 
the number of purchases of lower and higher income 
households, removal of import protection could significantly 
improve the relative lot of lower income households by 
reducing prices. 
Table 4: Expenditure Sub-Groups for Which Low 
Income Households Reported Few Purchases, 
1985-1986 
Income Group 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Percentage of households 
reporting expenditure) 
Expenditure 
Sub-Group 
Housing 
- mortgage payments 
- property maintenance goods 
Household Operation 
- household equipment and 
utensils 
- furniture 
- furnishings 
- floor coverings 
- household textiles 
Apparel 
- men's clothing 
- women's clothing 
- children's clothing 
- clothing supplies and 
services 
- men's footwear 
- women's footwear 
- children's footwear 
Transport 
- overseas travel 
- purchase of road vehicles 
Other Goods 
- alcohol 
- toiletries and cosmetics 
- personal goods 
- pets, racehorses, livestock 
- leisure and recreational 
goods 
- recreational vehicles 
Source: Based on Department of Statistics (19871, Table 2. 
It might be argued that benefits of cheaper imports 
would be offset by higher unemployment. The good news on 
this point is that, apart from temporary unemployment as 
protected industries restructure, moving towards a neutral 
trade policy stance does not permanently increase 
unemployment and can decrease it overall (see World Bank, 
1987, Chapter 6). Moreover, retraining and relocation 
schemes can even ease temporary unemployment. Overall, 
removal of import protection significantly enhances 
opportunities for lower income households to achieve their 
material aspirations; thereby improving distribution of 
consumption. 
3.3 Distribution of Production Amonq Reqions 
A feature of import protection is that the import 
substitutes produced domestically tend to be uncompetitive 
internationally so that they are restricted to the domestic 
market. There is a tendency for import substitution 
industries to set up in the main metropolitan areas so as to 
minimise costs such as transport and promotion and to be 
close to the politicians or bureaucrats who allocate import 
protection. Thus import protection amounts to a perverse 
form of regional assistance. The main centres like 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch gain at the expense of 
"regional" New Zealand. Data illustrating manufacturing 
concentration are illustrated in Table 5. It is clear that 
most manufacturing (over 57 per cent) is concentrated in the 
three main centres and that the distribution of 
manufacturing very closely follows that of population 
(probably a two-way relationship historically). Preliminary 
work on the concentration of protected manufacturing 
industry (including primary product processing) undertaken 
by the Treasury indicates that the highest rates of 
assistance are concentrated in the main metropolitan areas 
(see Treasury, 1987, pp 239-250 and Appendix 3 of this 
paper) . 
If import protection was removed many businesses would 
have to look to overseas markets to expand their sales. 
Over time this would mean that businesses would relocate in 
regional areas where resources such as industrial land are 
cheaper and overall costs of employing labour are lower. 
There would be little advantage in remaining in the main 
centres for businesses that marketed overseas because they 
would be marketing to the "world" population rather than 
just the New Zealand population. Furthermore, existing 
manufacturing industries in regional areas would benefit 
from removal of import protection because there would be 
downward pressure on costs of things like machinery, 
transport equipment and building materials. At present 
nearly half of the output of regional manufacturing 
industries is primary product based and most of this is 
exported. Lower costs would encourage further processing 
within New Zealand thus adding value to exports. 
Perhaps more importantly, new businesses would very 
likely become established in regional areas instead of 
setting up in the main centres. Changes in the pattern of 
manufacturing concentration would help revitalise the 
regions and reduce congestion problems (including high real 
estate prices) in Auckland and Wellington. Many of these 
new manufacturing businesses would be primary product based. 
It might be argued that the above scenario implies that 
New Zealand would mainly produce primary product-based 
output which, because of prevailing protection policies 
around the world, would be difficult to sell. 
Table 5: Concentration of Manufacturing in New Zealand, 1983-84 
Local Government Activity Units Persons Employed Total Sales Population at 
Region March 1985 
Number % of Number % of $m % of Number % of 
Total Total Total x 1000 Total 
Northland 
Auckland 
Thames Valley 
Bay of Plenty 
Waikato 
Tongariro 
East Cape 
Hawke's Bay 
Taranaki 
Wanganui 
Manawatu 
Horowhenua 
Wellington 
Wairarapa 
Total - North Island 
Nelson Bays 
Marlborough 
West Coast 
Canterbury 
Aorangi 
Clutha - Central Otago 
Coastal - North Otago 
Southland 
Total - South Island 
TOTAL - NEW ZEALAND 
Source: Based on Department of Statistics, Official Year Book 1986-87, Table 19.6 and 5.7 
This would almost certainly not be the case 
because, although agricultural land is a relatively 
abundant resource in New Zealand, there is no special reason 
why all non-primary product based manufacturing activity 
would disappear. In a recent study of patterns world 
trade (see Leamer, 1984) New Zealand resources were ranked 
in the following order of abundance: land, capital goods, 
professional and skilled workers, minerals and economic 
size. It is likely therefore that New Zealand would 
specialise in producing primary product based outputs but, 
given its small economic size, this country would also be 
- very well suited to specialising in small production runs of 
manufactured goods designed for specific market niches. It 
is worth emphasising here that the tools of modern marketing 
management are now well enough refined to make international 
niche marketing an exciting possibility for small countries 
like New Zealand. 
Some industries that are now not internationally 
competitive might become so as costs of their inputs fell. 
Industries that are now forced to buy high cost domestically 
produced inputs would be able to source their inputs at 
lowest cost from anywhere in the world. Industrial 
development in Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore points to the 
potential success of this strategy, the latter two examples 
more so because of their relatively small populations. 
Efficient domestic suppliers of inputs need have no great 
fear of predatory "dumping" either. A recent study by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Developnient 
concluded that this is actually a rare occurrence. When it 
does occur it is usually made possible by export assistance 
to overseas producers provided by their own governments (see 
Grey, 1985). 
3.4 Import Protection as a Tax on Exports: Reaional 
Effects 
It is now widely agreed that import protection acts as a 
tax on exports because it raises domestic prices. A recent 
review of research suggests that, for a number of countries, 
about 70 per cent of the increase in prices of import 
competing products is passed on to other prices, thereby 
raising the cost structure of the whole economy (see 
Lattimore, 1986). Therefore, the effect of an across-the- 
board tariff of 30 per cent would be to raise the price 
level for the whole economy by over 20 per cent. Because 
exporters are not able to pass on their cost increases, the 
tariff is an implicit tax on their activity. 
Direct estimates of the degree to which import 
protection increases the domestic price level in New Zealand 
vary from around 60 to 80 per cent (see Russel, 1986) to 
around 40 to 45 per cent (see Evans and others, 1987). 
Despite the variation in estimates they are all 
significantly large so they support the idea that import 
protection acts as an implicit tax on exporters. ( An 
indirect estimate of only 7 per cent for agricultural 
exports was obtained by Business and Economic Research 
Limited (1985) implying that a 30 per cent across-the-board 
tariff would raise the costs of agricultural production by 
only about 2 per cent. Compared to results of other 
research in New Zealand and overseas this is an unusually 
low estimate and should be treated with caution.) 
Apart from the domestic price effect of import 
protection there will also be an exchange rate effect. 
Regardless of other influences, import protection normally 
places upward pressure on exchange rates because it reduces 
the value of imports at the border. (By making imports more 
expensive within the border protection reduces demand for 
them). The higher are exchange rates the lower is the 
profitability of exporting. The exchange rate effect is 
another implicit tax on exporters. 
It is a fact that the bulk of New Zealand's export goods 
are produced outside the main urban areas. In the year 
ending June 1987, nearly three-quarters of the goods 
exported from New Zealand were primary products: mainly 
wool, meat, dairy products, horticultural products, fish and 
forest products (Source: Department of Statistics). These 
exports made up nearly 60 per cent of New Zealand's total 
receipts on the current account of the balance of payments. 
It is clear therefore, that regional New Zealand pays a 
proportionately larger share of the implicit export tax than 
do the major urban areas. This conclusion is supported by 
the Treasury work referred to previously (see also Appendix 
3 to this paper). Treasury estimates indicate that, the 
regions with lower levels of assistance attributable to 
import protection, export higher proportions of their 
production than do those regions with higher levels of 
assistance. 
The analysis presented here and in section 3.2 makes it 
quite clear that import protection is both an implicit 
subsidy to the main metropolitan areas and an implicit tax 
on other areas. The combined effect has probably been to 
cause urban drift and regional decline in New Zealand over a 
long period of time. Removal of import protection should 
give regions outside the main metropolitan areas a very 
substantial boost. Indeed, removal of import protection 
could be a very positive regional development policy. 

SECTION 4 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTEGRATED POLICY PACKAGE 
4.1 Backuround 
No economic policy is developed in a vacuum. Policy 
should always be interpreted within the broad social, 
economic and political agenda of a nation's elected 
representatives. It is a fact too, that the success of one 
policy in achieving its objective(s) is often influenced by 
the setting of other policies. There is now a large 
amount of research available on the consequences of 
inconsistent policy mixes especially in the context of trade 
liberalisation. The message that has emerged is that trade 
liberalisation is best supported by an appropriate policy 
package. This was made clear by the Working Party Report in 
its comments on the importance of the "link between tariff 
reform, liberalisation in other markets, and macroeconomic 
policy" (p. 53). 
4.2 The Appropriate Policy Packaqe 
Experiences of a large number of countries that have 
embarked upon trade liberalisation strategies are summarised 
in two recent surveys (see Wolf, 1986 and Mussa, 1987). It 
is clear from the experiences of other countries that 
rationalisation and lowering of import protection and export 
assistance must be done rapidly and must be accompanied by 
rapid reduction of the government budget deficit, a lower 
(real) exchange rate, and increased flexibility in the 
labour market. Unless all these are accomplished, short 
term costs of adjustment will be unnecessarily high. There 
is no advantage in removing foreign exchange controls until 
trade has been liberalised and the inflation rate (and high 
nominal interest rates) reduced. Removing foreign exchange 
control too early tends to induce net financial capital 
inflows into a country, making it difficult to cement in a 
lower real exchange rate. Above all however, a trade 
liberalisation package has to be credible, that is, 
everybody should believe that government is serious in its 
intentions. The Working Party Report stressed that "the 
success of any (liberalisation) programme is dependent on 
the credibility of government policies and the 
implementation of complementary moves aimed at promoting 
market flexibility, improved information flows, and reduced 
uncertainty ..." (p. 53). Rayner and Lattimore (19871, who 
analysed New Zealand's experience with trade policy from 
1950 to the present, also concluded that the viability of a 
trade liberalisation programme depends heavily on other 
policies. Some of the major policy requirements identified 
by the Working Party and Rayner and Lattimore are discussed 
below. 
First, a rapid reduction in the government's budget 
deficit is necessary: This can be achieved in part by 
removing all industry assistance that is directly paid for 
by government. In 1983-84, for example, government provided 
about $2,000 million in assistance to industry and 
agriculture (Source: Treasury, 1984, p. 196). This was 
equivalent to almost two-thirds of the budget deficit for 
that year. Another important element in reduction of the 
budget deficit is improvement in the efficiency of 
government itself. This requires that the provision of 
government services like health, education, defence, law and 
order, communications and electricity be cost effective. 
Government administration and policy advisory services 
provided by departments such as Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Labour, Trade and Industry, Social Welfare and Treasury and 
organisations such as the Reserve Bank, must also be 
efficient. This is not to say that government should simply 
apply the "user pays" principle to all aspects of government 
activity but, even where the discipline of the user pays 
market is not deemed appropriate, management audits could 
point to ways of avoiding or eliminating economic waste. 
The Government's efforts to induce efficiency by means of 
the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 are to be applauded but 
the Act only directly applies to a small part of government 
activity. Much more needs to be done to ensure that the 
quality of government expenditure improves. 
A consequence of a budget deficit is that there will be 
upward pressure on exchange rates in the short term. This 
can occur directly or indirectly. If government borrows 
from overseas, foreign capital inflow will increase and this 
will push up exchange rates directly: if government borrows 
domestically interest rates will rise (as government 
competes against financial institutions for the pool of 
domestic savings) and induce foreign capital inflow that, in 
turn, will push up exchange rates. High exchange rates 
lower the cost of importing and reduce the profitability of 
exporting so that New Zealand producers become less 
competitive. If New Zealand businesses fail as a result, 
then short term adjustment costs of trade liberalisation are 
increased. 
A second requirement for successful trade liberalisation 
is low inflation. If the domestic inflation rate is high 
compared to the rest of the world then the real exchange 
rate will also be high. The real exchange rate can be 
thought of as the competitiveness of domestic exports on 
world markets and of foreign imports on the domestic market. 
Competitiveness is determined by the actual exchange rate 
adjusted for costs of production in the domestic economy 
compared to the rest of the world. A high real exchange 
rate makes it more difficult for export industries to 
compete on world markets and for import substitution 
industries to compete on the domestic market. 
In New Zealand the real exchange rate has increased by 
nearly 50 per cent since the devaluation in 1984 owing to 
both high domestic interest rates and inflation (Source: 
Calculated from Bank of New Zealand, 1987). The high real 
exchange rate is probably New Zealand's most serious 
impediment to rapid adjustment to removal of import 
protection. 
A third important condition required for successful 
trade liberalisation is flexibility in the labour market. 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 makes provision for 
contracting arrangements that allow for movement away from 
the national award system. This ought to make it possible 
to closely tailor terms and conditions (including wages and 
salaries) of employment much more closely to specific 
work places. Government could further assist labour market 
flexibility by ensuring that appropriate retraining and 
relocation programmes are established. 
Fourth, an efficient financial market is likely to 
assist success of a trade liberalisation programme. 
Deregulation has been bolder and more complete in New 
Zealand's financial market than in any other area of the 
economy. Indeed, New Zealand now has one of the least 
regulated financial markets in the world. The advantages of 
a competitive financial market are twofold. First, 
financial institutions cannot artificially maintain above- 
market interest rates on loans by acting like a cartel if 
there is plenty of competition. Second, in order to stay in 
business, financial institutions will have to offer 
innovative services and encourage innovation on the part of 
their clients. With experience, financial institutions and 
their clients ought to become expert at "picking winners", 
far more expert than politicians or bureaucrats ever were or 
could be. 
4.3 A Strateqy for Removal of Import Protection 
Experience in both New Zealand and the rest of the world 
indicates that, in the short term, some businesses fail and 
unemployment increases (although by less than is commonly 
believed) after import protection is reduced. In New 
Zealand's case some industries are very heavily protected, 
the real exchange rate is very high and only tentative moves 
towards increased flexibility have been made in the labour 
market. Therefore it is likely that overnight removal of 
import protection would impose high short term adjustment 
costs. This is not a reason to postpone change because 
removal of import protection will benefit low income 
households, regions outside the main metropolitan areas and 
the economy as a whole. Ultimately, it is up to politicians 
to decide whether the beneficiaries of import protection 
should continue to gain at the expense of the rest of the 
economy. However, some guidelines for a strategy are 
available. First, theoretical models of the effects of 
removal of import protection support the idea that reducing 
protection to the most heavily protected industries more 
than others has a greater overall welfare payoff than 
reducing protection across the board (see Lloyd, 1973). The 
so-called Swiss formula described by the Working Party 
Report (pp 64-67) achieves this objective. Under the Swiss 
formula the tariff in the current time period is given by 
the ratio (c.xf/(c+x), where c is a constant and x is the 
tariff in the last time period. 
Second, if the trade liberalisation policy is credible 
and well understood, and if the terminal level of protection 
is unambiguously defined, (and non-negotiable), businesses 
will incorporate that information into their plans. A 
transition period of five years would probably be very 
suitable under these conditions since businesses rarely 
appear to formulate detailed plans over longer time 
horizons. (This comment is based on perusal of a number of 
published annual reports of businesses that operate in New 
Zealand. ) 
Therefore, the Swiss formula applied over five years 
would be appropriate for New Zealand, This would require 
the complete abandonment of import licensing immediately, 
with licences being replaced by tariffs to which the Swiss 
formula would be applied. For industries under industry 
plans the Swiss formula should be applied as soon as the 
plans expire, thus rapidly bringing those industries into 
line with all others. 
Given that the costs of import protection are high and 
the gains accruing upon its removal are high the most 
appropriate level of import protection is zero. Therefore, 
after the tariff reform period, the only restrictions 
applying to imports ought to be those related to health or 
safety. 
SECTION 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper a number of arguments in favour of 
removing import protection in New Zealand have been 
advanced. There are five main conclusions that support 
removal of protection. 
First, gains to an economy arising from comparative 
advantage are probably small. Other gains, such as 
reduction in the costs of lobbying and reduction of economic 
slack, are also probably fairly small. However, added 
together, these gains would be a worthwhile addition to the 
size of the nation's economic cake. 
Second, gains from removal of import protection are 
cumulative. Over time an outward-oriented dynamic, 
innovative economy will experience higher economic growth 
than an inward-oriented economy. 
Third, low income households are adversely affected by 
import protection. Free trade would reduce prices of many 
of the goods they buy, thus enhancing their welfare. Free 
trade would not increase unemployment except in the short 
term. 
Fourth, removal of import protection would remove a 
perverse implicit subsidy to the main metropolitan areas and 
implicit tax on other areas. It would encourage relocation 
of existing businesses and establishment of new businesses 
in "regional" New Zealand. Many, but not all, of these 
businesses would be involved in primary product based 
activities. Lower import protection would be a positive 
regional development policy. 
Fifth, and finally, the short-term adjustment costs of 
removing import protection (and export assistance) can be 
minimised if the trade liberalisation programme is credible 
and accompanied by an appropriate package of other economic 
policies. 
The costs of import protection are high. Gains accruing 
from removal of import protection are high. The most 
appropriate level of import protection therefore is zero. 
SECTION 6 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Tariff Working Party Report did not recommend a 
specific programme for reduction of import protection. 
However it noted that the greatest net benefits are obtained 
from reducing the highest tariffs and having a more uniform 
tariff structure and recommended that the period of kariff 
reform should be three to five years (pp 77, 78). 
The recommendation of this Discussion Paper is that 
import protection be reduced to zero over a period of five 
years, according to the Swiss formula. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Notes on Proportion of Income Spent by Households 
In Table 3 some data on proportion of income spent by 
households is set out. These data are based on the 
Household Expenditure and Income Survey, 1985-86 undertaken 
by the Department of Statistics. The Department cautions 
against using the Survey to compare total expenditure 
against total income for a number of reasons. The main 
reason is that the Department cannot verify that reported 
expenditure for each surveyed household exactly matches its 
reported gross income less income tax (less saving or plus 
borrowing). 
Data on proportions of income spent that are shown in 
Table 3 are calculated by expressing average weekly 
expenditure as a proportion of the top income in each group. 
Thus, for income group 5 the proportion of income spent was: 
184 - (11,999 - 365 x 7 )  = 0.8 or 80 per cent. 
The only exception was for income group 1 in which case 
an annual gross income of $60,000 was used so that the 
proportion of income spent was: 
699 - (60,000 - 365 x 7 )  = 0.61 or 61 per cent. 
Using a different rule for determining income changes 
the proportions of income spent but does not alter the 
result that lower income households spent a higher 
proportion of their incomes than most higher income 
households. Therefore the data support the contention in 
Section 3.2 that import protection acts as a regressive tax 
on lower income households. 
APPENDIX 2 
Estimated Nominal Price Margins Over World Price Levels Due 
to Import Protection in Manufacturing Industries, Averaqe 
-
Manufacturing Industry Group Price Margin 
% 
Food, beverages and tobacco 33.5 
Textiles 46.5 
Clothing 64.5 
Furniture 55.1 
Printed products 107.2 
Leather goods 82.1 
Rubber goods 51.1 
Petroleum products 47.3 
Other chemicals 54.7 
Non-metalic minerals 94.0 
Metal products 69.5 
Electrical products 69.6 
Footwear (1 35.7 
Chemical fertilisers (1) 9.3 
Basic metal products (1) 6.3 
Machinery ( 1) 36.0 
Vehicle assembly and other transport goods (1) 22.7 
Miscellaneous 89.4 
Weighted Average 61.4 
Note: 
(1) Average 1978/79 
Source: Lattimore (1985) 
APPENDIX 3 
Regional Assistance Patterns and Exports by Region 
Regional Assistance Patterns 
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